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A crucial dilemma facing mineral-rich countries is how public revenues, often cynically 
designated as rents, could be harnessed for equitable and effective development. 
Conceptually, this issue has become important due to various analyses that have underscored 
the corrosive effects of mineral rents on state institutions, policy processes and economic 
output. While the underlying prognosis of the scepticism associated with mineral-driven 
development continues to be interrogated, different academics and policy activists tend to 
agree that the real challenges of mineral-led growth, in particular, and resource-rich 
countries, in general, do not pertain to the presence of resource-rents per se, but how they 
are managed and used (eg. Acemoglu et al., 2003; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; Morrison, 2012). 
Consequently, significant weight has been placed on various mitigation strategies that have 
sought to deploy democratic oversight and effective governance as a way of securing 
optimum developmental transformation from the mining sector. As the number of these 
technocratic interventions continues to grow, the main research and policy agenda has been 
dictated by the need to track and interrogate compliance by actors ranging from governments 
to extractive firms (cf. Barma, 2011; Gaventa & McGee, 2013; Gillies & Heuty, 2011). 
However, the interest in tracking compliance, often based on pre-determined notions of 
effective extractive sector governance, has not come with the same enthusiasm in exploring 
how these interventions interact with the deep vectors of power, politics, and contestations 
that constitute the pre-conditions for optimum transformation in implementing countries (cf. 
Bourgouin & Haarstad, 2013:102). This paper takes on this issue by exploring Ghana’s 
experience with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and its interaction 
with domestic institutions and political economy drivers to shape the institutional landscape 
of the mining industry. 
The EITI is one of the instruments that have gained much traction, especially in the global 
architecture for the management of extractive resources. The Initiative, which was 
introduced in 2002, generally prescribes public disclosure of payments, revenues, and 
receipts from resource extraction, overseen by multi-stakeholder deliberations. Currently, 23 
countries, ranging from Senegal to Ethiopia, have added to the impressive list of EITI 
implementing states in Africa, often because of pressure from international donors and 
domestic civil society activists. The EITI’s attraction has been further fuelled by its promise to 
generate “win-win” outcomes that would address poverty, prevent violent conflicts, and 
secure economic transformation through enhanced investments (see EITI International 
Secretariat, 2015). However, EITI opponents have not only voiced concerns about the 
empirical basis of these assertions. They have also pointed to its pseudo-reformism, especially 
when squared with other mandatory global national-level initiatives like the Dodd-Frank 
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Act, 2008, in the United States. Across several African countries, EITI has also run against a 
sizeable level of opposition among activists who have rallied around alternative regional 
instruments, such as the African Mining Vision, as the most effective mechanism for ensuring 
beneficial ownership and value-added economic transformation. A key weakness of these 
debates is that they lack adequate empirical information (see McGee & Gaventa, 2011). 
Ghana is often cited as an important signpost for not only what the EITI has accomplished, 
but also how it could be. Since 2003, when Ghana pioneered the Initiative in the mining 
industry, the country has recorded significant progress in terms of institutionalising various 
EITI mechanisms, in the shape of a multi-stakeholder National Steering Committee (NSC), 
and produced eight audit reports (see EITI International Secretariat, 2014b). Ghana has also 
been associated with a number of national-level innovation schemes in the form of sub-
national reporting, disclosure of disaggregated data, and process auditing (Aguilar et al., 
2011; Manteaw, 2010; Nguyen-Thanh & Schnell, 2009). Hence, whereas the most ardent 
supporters of the EITI are often happy to admit to its focus on revenues and payments, claims 
about the structures and impact of the EITI in Ghana are often uncharacteristically bold. For 
instance, the 2010 validation report, presented Ghana as having “gone considerably beyond 
the basic requirements” of the EITI (IDL Group & Synergy Global, 2010:40). 1 As the paper 
demonstrates soon, within the global EITI community, Ghana’s impressive profile and a 
number of domestic reforms linked to the Initiative has been well documented and 
articulated. However, while the EITI is often framed in transformational language, beyond 
various policy evaluations, there has been no attempt to demonstrate how its adoption in 
Ghana has worked to alter the adverse institutional environment around which resources are 
extracted and utilised. This paper combines insights from field data drawn through over 
hundred interviews, as part of PhD study, with various stakeholders - including public 
officials, community activists, extractive firms, and external development agencies - and 
documentary sources to explore how Ghana’s compliance with the EITI has transformed the 
institutional and political economy landscape of the mining industry. The evidence in this 
paper suggests that whereas the Initiative has facilitated the transfer of market-oriented 
norms and minimal policy access, its impact on altering the institutional landscape has been 
rather limited. 
 
                                                          
1 Within the lexicon of the EITI, validation refers to an “external, independent evaluation mechanism, 




The Making of the EITI “Model”  
Historically, the EITI is credited with the former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in an 
address at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Its broader appeal pivoted 
on a response to a groundswell of support for revenue transparency from resource extraction 
that was forged through academic debates and private sector-led interventions as well as 
activism by various civil society groups at the turn of the 21st century (see Acosta, 2013; 
Benner et al., 2010; Corrigan, 2014). 
As outlined in Figure 1 below, the institutional structures of the EITI mainly encapsulates 
three procedures: Firstly, implementing countries ensure that all relevant companies (foreign 
and domestic) declare to the government, payments for extracting natural resources (usually 
through persuasion and voluntary agreements and, in few cases, legal regulations). Secondly, 
these figures are compared against the government’s own declaration of revenues received. 
Thirdly, after the data has been checked and verified by independent bodies they are made 
public based on recommendations by the EITI International Board (Weidner, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. Structure of EITI (Source: EITI Secretariat) 
Over the past decade, compliance with the EITI continues to grow globally with developing 
countries, including Norway, adding to new entrants of EITI implementers. Despite the 
impressive level of compliance, as well as notable revisions to the EITI Standard over the past 
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decade, debates about its prospects in altering the institutional landscape of the extractive 
sector continue to attract polarising perspectives: 
Leading EITI activists, donor agencies, and policy makers who hold benign viewpoints about 
the EITI have pointed to its prospects engendering “win-win” outcomes for all stakeholders 
in the extractive industry. For international donors, the EITI has become a convenient strategy 
for addressing extractive industry governance concerns (Gillies, 2010). As demonstrated in 
the case of Ghana, officials within EITI implementing countries often consider the EITI as an 
integral part of national strategies meant to meet donor “conditionalities” and send signals for 
attracting foreign direct investments. Among extractive companies, public support for the 
Initiative, even at the rhetorical level, is considered key in pursuing reputational agendas and 
gaining credibility in the face of mounting pressure from “norm entrepreneurs” (ibid). Many 
domestic non-governmental and community-based organisations who support the initiative, 
have sought to employ various EITI multi-stakeholder platforms to demand social 
accountability from resource extraction. Consequently, a key narrative that has sustained the 
EITI agenda pointed to its relevance in building a strong global alliance for the effective 
management of natural resources based on the principles of transparency, accountability and 
public participation (Eigen, 2009). Weidner (2011), for instance, has noted that the EITI has 
made an impressive output in terms of the establishment of governance structures, 
procedural norms, and communication networks in participating countries. Garuba and 
Ikubaje (2010), in the case of Nigeria, have also pointed to EITI’s role in bolstering the 
extractive capacity of the state for revenues by exposing serious discrepancies in revenue 
agencies and irregularities in auditing standards. Finally, Aaronson (2011) has shown that 
there is positive correlation between EITI countries with enhanced accountability and 
improved business climate. 
On the other hand, mounting malevolent perspectives have questioned the EITI’s viability, 
especially given its reliance on voluntary compliance, and propensity to empower social elites 
through exclusive deliberative platforms that undermine overall public participation (cf. 
Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Smith et al., 2012). Here, there have been some doubts about the 
performance of EITI countries based on established “good governance” indices like anti-
corruption (Haufler, 2010). For example, Ölcer (2009) examined EITI participating countries 
between 2002 and 2007, and pointed out that they do not demonstrate a marked distinction 
from non-EITI resource-rich countries, in terms of the Corruption Perception Index and 
World Governance Indicators. Other critics have also raised issues about the inability of the 
EITI to incorporate strategic global actors in the energy industry particularly, OPEC and 
China (Benner et al., 2010).   
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The middle of the spectrum is populated by more prudent standpoints that maintain that 
while the EITI remains an invaluable component of the extractive sector governance, it is 
solely inadequate in tackling the multiple and complex value-chain that underpins the 
exploration, extraction and utilisation of resources. Most importantly, this viewpoint argues 
that taking a revenue-centred approach, without looking at issues of expenditure, such as 
public procurement and award of contracts is overly simplistic (Barma, 2012; Schnell & 
Großmann, 2011).  The prudent strand of the literature has also called for more convincing 
empirical insights in evaluating governance outcomes in participating countries. Specifically, 
there have been concerns that EITI, rather than providing critical and neutral analysis of its 
engagements in countries, often present vague statements about “learning processes” that are 
not generally helpful for empirical evaluation (Weidner, 2011). 
This paper responds to the more prudent standpoints by interrogating the extent to which 
the EITI interact with the nested network of actors, institutions, and processes of Ghana’s 
mining sector. Among others, it explores some of the normative and empirical issues 
concerning how broad structures and processes associated with global governance, interact 
with domestic political economy dynamics to promote, or hinder, developmental outcomes 
in the mining sector. The presentation here is far from mainstream accounts that suggest a 
generally less contentious EITI implementation in Ghana, which has yielded notable impact 
in the mining sector. Rather, it underscores deep-seated contestations and elite 
instrumentalisation that have undermined the EITI process in the country. 
A Conflictual Path towards Compliance in Ghana 
Ghana formally began its participation in the EITI following an announcement at the first 
meeting on the Initiative on June 17, 2003 which was convened by the then British Prime 
Minister, Tony Blair, at Lancaster House in London. Following the announcement to 
participate in the EITI, the Kuffuor administration took immediate steps to institutionalise its 
implementation in Ghana. On June 17, 2004, after a series of stakeholder meetings in 
collaboration with the Ghana Chamber of Mines and with the support of UK’s Department 
of International Development (DFID), the Government officially launched the Ghana 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (GHEITI) in Tarkwa, a mining town in the 
Western region (IDL Group & Synergy ltd, 2010). The country’s pioneering role in the EITI is 
ingrained in the global normative environment for market-enhancing transparency and 
accountability. Within the Ghanaian context, as demonstrated by implementation challenges 
with various reforms, including the Financial Administration Act, 2003 (Act 654), the Public 
Procurement Act, 2004 (Act, 663), the Whistleblower Act, 2006 (Act 720), and the National 
Anti-Corruption Plan (2012), compliance with various transformative initiatives often fits 
into an effective elite strategy to secure rents from donors and foreign investors. However, 
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how the EITI has been internalised to effectively transform the institutional and incentive 
environment of the extractive industry reflected a more contested and conflictual pattern. 
The rationale for the country’s decision to implement EITI in the mining sector was largely 
informed by various factors: 
 
Prior to GHEITI, Ghana undertook various reforms in the mining sector, essentially to attract 
foreign investments to revamp the ailing mining sector, as part of the Economic Reform 
Programmes (ERPs). The impact of these reforms, in terms of heightened investments in 
exploration and extraction, which raised central government’s revenues, equally evoked 
various questions about environmental costs, social and economic impact, as well as 
distribution of revenues accruing from mining (see Akabzaa et al., 2007; Aryee, 2001; 
Campbell, 2004). These questions were more evident in mining communities, most of whom 
maintained that increased mining activities had come at the cost of their livelihoods, without 
adequate compensation, which coupled with poor business practices and government 
neglect, exacerbated poverty. Various agitations took the form of sporadic violent 
confrontations and civil action by mining communities and other NGOs, which swayed 
public opinion against mining firms. Through initiatives, like the National Coalition on 
Mining, which was formed in 2001, various NGOs and community groups forged national, 
regional and global networks to demand reforms in the mining sector (see National Coalition 
on Mining, 2003). Mining firms, through the Ghana Chamber of Mines (GCM) responded to 
these calls by publishing details of public payments in the media. Similarly, the government 
started disclosing mining-sector receipts with explicit designations in various budget 
statements and press releases. As confirmed by various interviewees who were involved in 
the early stages of EITI implementation in Ghana, the Initiative offered a framework to 
“manage” the tension and cynicism in the sector and synchronise disclosure by government 
and companies. 
 
Other political and economic factors shaped Ghana’s accession to the EITI Framework. 
President Kuffour and the NPP Government took over the reins of government in 2001 on 
the back of severe economic difficulties largely due to rising oil prices, decline in export 
revenues from cocoa, gold and timber, as well as the loss of fiscal discipline owing to the 
2000 general elections (CEPA, 2003:3 in Whitfield & Jones, 2009).  As recalled by Whitfield 
and Jones (2009), the economic challenges were compounded by a severe strain in the 
relationship between Ghana and the IMF and various donors due to the previous NDC 
government’s failure to comply with IMF conditions. This strain was all the more serious 
given the fact that decades of reliance on foreign aid and the proliferation of various donor 
programmes had permeated the state apparatus with donor finance estimated at 40-50% of 
government expenditure by 2001 (CDF,2002Whitfield & Jones, 2009:196). In 2000, these 
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factors culminated into rising inflation, depreciation in the Cedi, acute shortage of foreign 
currency and stalled economic growth, recorded at 3.7% (Government of Ghana, 2001).  
Within the extractive sector, there was a gaping hole in donor engagement especially when 
the World Bank withdrew its engagements following an unsuccessful implementation of the 
National Resource Management Project (1998-2003). According to the Bank, the decision to 
withdraw was due to a number of weaknesses that inhered in the mining sector. These 
included, “slow and uneven progress on policy reform,” absence of sustainable management 
practices, distorted incentive structures, lack of transparency, poor governance and a 
declining importance of “non-productive” environmental concerns to Government (IEG, 
2008 in World Bank-IEG, 2014). 
 
The newly elected NPP Government in 2001 committed to reversing trends in donor 
engagements based on a large-scale engagement with the good governance mantra.  In his 
Second State of the Nation address, President John Kufour identified good governance as one 
of the “development priorities” of his government (Government of Ghana, 2002). The 
objective, as elucidated by the 2002 budget presentation of the Finance Minister, included 
restructuring of the civil service, promoting the rule of law and supporting the three arms of 
government, enhancing social order with support for the police service, and strengthening 
the office of the Attorney-General while boosting assistance to the judiciary. Hence, the NPP 
Government’s good governance priority was envisaged as part of broader measures to woo 
the private sector and serve as one of the triggers that would restore relations with external 
donor agencies.  In the same budget, for instance, the Foreign Ministry and diplomatic 
missions abroad were specifically charged with the “promotion of Ghana as an important 
partner in good governance and a haven for private sector investment” (ibid.). This call was 
backed by numerous engagements, directly spearheaded by the President, such as 
participation in the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Highly Indebted Poor 
Country Initiative (HIPC). The Government’s formal launch of the GHEITI in 2004, after going 
through EITI accession procedures became critical in the restoration of donor support and 
raising the country’s investment profile for the extractive industry. A high-ranking member 
of the NPP Government, at a National EITI Workshop in 2007 confirmed this point when he 
observed: 
 
It is hoped that a transparent Extractive Industry in Ghana will bring about an 
improved investment climate by providing clear signal to investors and the 
international community, especially financial institutions that the Government of 




Hence, the EITI operated as part of various institutional mechanisms that were adopted under 
the “market-enhancing” good governance approach (see Kahn, 2012).  
 
Predictably, the EITI adoption received mixed responses from various groups within the 
extractive sector. Mining companies, most of which had established some formalised 
channels of interaction with the Government, through the Chamber of Mines embraced the 
Initiative wholeheartedly. An interviewee from the Chamber even averred that it was the 
mining companies that “actually pushed” the Government to sign on to the EITI because, for 
the mining companies, “the Initiative is like getting a third-party person to tell a good story 
about you” (personal interview, July 31, 2013). Whereas other NGO respondents disputed 
this claim, the inclusion of the then CEO of the Chamber, Ms Joyce Wireko-Brobbey, in 
Ghana’s delegation to the Lancaster Conference points to the active involvement of the 
mining companies in the Government’s decision to join the EITI. 
 
Whereas mining companies embraced the EITI wholeheartedly, domestic NGOs linked to the 
extractive sector, were polarised mainly along two schools:  
 
The first group, largely various organisations that had been active in campaigning for the 
abolition of mining, led by the Third World Network (TWN)-Ghana, conceived of the EITI as 
a “ploy” to diffuse what they considered a growing momentum for NGO activism in the 
mining sector (personal interview with NGO activist, August 7, 2013). At the heart of this 
criticism was that the EITI did not address the core problems of the extractive sector such as 
human rights abuses, environmental degradation, and social dislocation (ibid.). TWN-Ghana 
also raised questions about the structure of the EITI. During interviews with TWN-Ghana 
officials, they insisted that one has to be cynical about the fact that Government, an entity that 
was “not putting information out there,” was expected to host and drive the Initiative. They 
also argued that no amount of information disclosure would change lopsided fiscal terms in 
the extractive sector without addressing   issues of equity and fairness. Furthermore, they 
averred that there are more expansive and progressive regional alternatives to the EITI, which 
Ghana has signed on to, but failed to implement largely because they fell in the pecking order 
of donor priorities. A case in point relates to the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and 
the 2009 African Mining Vision that, in their view, contain elaborate mechanisms of 
governance and requirements for linking mineral extraction with development priorities, 
domestic capacity and local enterprise (see African Union, 2009).2 Whereas Ghana was the 
                                                          
2 The APRM was initiated by the African Union in 2002 as part of the framework for the implementation of the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to monitor aspects of the governance and social 
development. In March 2003, Ghana signed the Memorandum of Understanding and became the first country 
to be peer reviewed under the APRM. 
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first country to subject itself to APRM review in 2003, critics within this NGO School insisted 
that the Government abandoned it for the “donor-fancied” EITI. 
 
Another school of thought, largely shared by NGOs who had rallied around Publish What 
You Pay (PWYP)-Ghana, while sharing in the criticism that the EITI was limited in its scope, 
maintained that it provided an opportunity and platform. This was because despite its 
limitations, the Global EITI Sourcebook, which outlined the main principles of the EITI, 
encouraged countries to be ambitious and did not limit in-country variations. Hence, 
embracing the Initiative provided CSOs with another room to engage and push for the 
broadening of its scope and deepening of its content (personal interview with NGO activist, 
August 7, 2013). 
 
Another contestation that dogged the EITI implementation was between the Government of 
Ghana and various donors, especially the World Bank. To develop this point, it is important 
to digress and recall a 2003 G-8 meeting in Evian that preceded the Lancaster meeting for 
the EITI. At the meeting, the G-8 adopted an Action Plan in which it agreed to push for an 
“intensified approach to transparency,” on “a voluntary basis.” The Evian Plan also encouraged 
“governments and companies, both private and state-owned, to disclose payments and 
receipts to the IMF or another agreed independent third party such as the World Bank or 
Multilateral Development Banks (G-8, 2003).” For the most part, the final EITI framework, 
which was adopted in Lancaster, remained less articulate about the role of various 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), as suggested by the Evian Summit, especially 
concerning in-country implementation.  
 
In the spirit of Evian, development agencies within advanced Western countries, envisaged a 
more assertive role for International Financial Institutions in the EITI. For them, the EITI was 
largely a global standard and were suspicious of attempts by domestic elites to tinker with its 
implementation. The World Bank’s centrality in driving EITI implementation in Ghana was 
bolstered by the fact that it was entrusted with managing the Multi-Donor Trust Fund 
(MDTF) through which technical and financial assistance to EITI implementing countries is 
provided (World Bank, 2014). On the contrary, officials of the Government of Ghana, with 
the support of the newly established NSC, underscored the need for country ownership and 
maintained that Ghana could take advantage of the EITI to build local capacity as alluded to 
by the EITI Source Book.3 They expressed a preference for procuring services from experts 
                                                          
 
3 The EITI Source Book maintain that the in the development and planning of the Initiative the “balance of 
responsibility for progress lies with the government. The Book continues that the government “will need to 
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“who had an understanding and appreciation of the challenges in the mining sector” in the 
country (personal interview with GHEITI representative, August 20, 2013).  
 
These contrasting positions of donor agencies and domestic actors around the EITI came to a 
head when the Government contracted Boas and Associates, a domestic auditing firm, to 
conduct the first country aggregation covering the period between 2004 and 2006. The 
World Bank and some development agencies raised concern about the appointing process 
(IDL Group & Synergy Global, 2010:20). According to the 2010 Validation report, the Bank 
requested the Government to reappoint the aggregator, to bring it in line with “international 
requirements” instead of the Ghana’s Public Procurement Act of 2003 (ibid:26). However, 
public officials, NSC members and representatives of development agencies disclosed during 
interviews that the World Bank asked the Government to employ an Aggregator, from among 
seven “international consultants” that it recommended, instead of the domestic auditing firm 
as a requirement for the release of funds for GHEITI. When the Government insisted on 
maintaining Boas and Associates, the Bank refused to fund the first GHEITI aggregation. 
Consequently, apart from some limited support from the GIZ, the take-off of GHEITI was 
sponsored by the Government of Ghana. 
 
The standoff between the Government and the donor community at the initial stage of the 
EITI process in Ghana added an impetus to national ownership of the EITI process, which, in 
turn, enhanced the leverage of domestic political elites over the programme. This also opened 
the way for less coherent donor engagements with GHEITI. Some development agencies, 
especially GIZ, have been more visible and offered funds for the publication and 
dissemination of various GHEITI reports. However, over the years, certain donor agencies, 
including the UK Government’s DFID and World Bank, have crafted parallel programmes 
alongside GHEITI. These parallel initiatives, including the Natural Resources and 
Environment Governance Programme (NREG), have also served as important routes by which 
various development agencies have attempted to carve out niche areas within the broader 







                                                          
ensure that the governance structures and processes, staff and financing mechanisms are in place” (EITI 
International Secretariat, 2005). 
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“The EITI operates like this; I will not come to you with a policeman, but I will wash your dirty linen in public.” 
The above description offered by an interviewee from GHEITI captures the institutional and 
operation make-up of the EITI in Ghana. GHEITI’s structure is essentially an adaptation of the 
global EITI Standard, which was developed locally in consultation with various stakeholders 
in the industry.  A year after launching GHEITI, the Government inaugurated a 16-member 
NSC as the principal governing body to oversee its implementation (Osei, 2007). Government 
representation on the NSC was structured along two main lines. At the political level, the 
Deputy Ministers from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) and the 
Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines (MLFM) were nominated to provide political leadership 
to the NSC. Additional representatives were drawn from various Government Ministries, 
specifically MOFEP and MLFM, and other departments such as the Office of the Administrator 
of Stool Lands and the erstwhile Internal Revenue Service (IRS).  Regarding the private sector, 
the Government received nomination from the Ghana Chamber of Mines.   
The main challenge of representation, given the internal divisions and the difficulty in 
establishing its main constituency, came from the civil society.  As recounted by a member of 
the PWYP-Ghana, the Government initially contacted the Ghana Association of Private 
Voluntary Organisations in Development (GAPVOD) to nominate a representative for civil 
society organisations in the country (personal interview, August 7, 2013). Under the auspices 
of the Integrated Social Development Centre (ISDOEC), GAPVOD organised a meeting of 
various NGOs who were engaged in the extractive sector at the Accra Teachers’ Hall in 2004. 
At the meeting, ISODEC, which convenes the local chapter of the PWYP campaign, was tasked 
to represent domestic CSOs in GHEITI and “bring all interested groups into the PWYP 
umbrella” (ibid.). After initial recriminations about the number of CSO representation in the 
NSC, another representative was nominated from within the PWYP platform.   
Members of the NSC were constituted into technical and sensitisation sub-committees. As 
revealed by various members of the NSC, these sub-committees provide an opportunity to 
draw from various expertise within and outside of the NSC. The Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MOFEP) is institutionally the Chair of the NSC and, through the GHEITI 
Secretariat, “coordinates” its activities (GHEITI Secretariat, 2011b). The Secretariat is charged 
with the day-to-day implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of GHEITI’s 
work plan. It is headed by an Executive Secretary, with the complement of about five officers, 
who are generally MOFEP officers that have been assigned to the GHEITI (personal interview 
with EITI official, 2013). 
The inception of GHEITI was backed by initial attempts to drive various country-level 
variations. Apart from a desire to appease domestic cynicism, the in-country variations were 
informed by the fact that mining firms, through the GCM, and the government were already 
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disclosing payments and receipts respectively. This began with the government’s insistence 
on procuring a local aggregator in defiance of the World Bank opposition. Other national 
variations included “process and financial audit” as well as “analysis of “historical 
documentation on production, exports and payment of royalties for minerals produced in the 
country” as spelt out in the Terms of Reference for the aggregator (Boas & Associates, 2006:4). 
Hence, successive GHEITI reports contained strong qualitative and contextual information 
beyond revenues and payments, and captured disbursement and expenditure patterns within 
local governments that receive mineral royalties.  
Whereas the novelties in Ghana have been applauded, concerns have been equally raised that 
GHEITI have not been able to venture into noticeable areas of elite patronage. Regarding, sub-
national reporting, for instance, there are criticisms that by not deeply interrogating 
disbursements to traditional authorities, which are usually not linked with formal scrutiny, 
GHEITI has failed to touch on traditional patronage networks that facilitate elite capture 
within extractive communities (see IDL Group and Synergy ltd, 2010: 30). EITI templates for 
reporting on disbursements to traditional authorities have, hitherto, not been accessed or 
verified by the aggregator (see Boas & Associates, 2007:39). Again, regarding companies, 
GHEITI targets what is refers to as “significant producers” in terms of royalty contribution. It 
excludes other strategic private operators in the mining sector, including exploration 
companies, service providers and small-scale miners.  
Another recurring institutional anomaly, outlined in Table 1 below, relates to the dominance 
of government representatives (both political and technical) on the NSC. During interviews, 
various members of the NSC have been adamant that this lopsided representation for the 
government is “inevitable” given the wide-ranging cover of various public agencies over 
different aspects of the extractive sector. They also maintained that decisions of the NSC are 
made on consensus and not through voting. Whereas consensus building has been critical in 
holding the balance for various representatives on the NSC, it points to the EITI’s de-
institutionalised character. Without the benefit of various institutionalised mechanisms, and 
the voluntary nature of the EITI process, it is not surprising that domestic cynics question its 







Table 6.1.  GHEITI National Steering Committee (Inaugurated, 2010) 
MINING AND MINERALS SECTOR (OLD GHEITI) 
Name Position Stakeholder 
Franklin Ashiadey Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning  Government 
Roger Angsomwine Office of the Vice President  Government 
Victoria Bension Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Government 
Gad Akwensivie Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands Government 
Sulemanu Koney Ghana Chamber of Mines Private  
Sheila Naah Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Government 
B. C. D. Ocansey Ghana Revenue Authority  Government 
Steve Manteaw Publish What You Pay-Ghana  Civil Society 
Chris Afedo Ghana Revenue Authority Government 
Amponsah Tawiah Minerals Commission Government 
Ellis P. Atiglah Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources Government 
OIL AND GAS (ADDED MEMBERS) 
Wayo Abubakari Office of the President Government 
Philomena Johnson National Catholic Secretariat CSO 
J.Y. A. Appiah Ministry of Energy Government  
J. B. Okai Ministry of Energy Government 
Kobina Pra Annan Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolitan Assembly Local Government 
Sam Ado Nortey Ghana National Petroleum Corporation State Enterprise 
Kevin Quinn Tullow Tullow Oil Ghana Private 
Dela Klubi Ghana Revenue Authority Government 
Frank Turkson Ghana Manganese Company Private-Public Enterprise 
Duodu Acheampong  Jomoro District Assembly Local Government 
Hannah O. Koranteng  WACAM CSO 
Credit: GHEITI Secretariat, Accra. 
There have been concerns that GHEITI operates largely on “goodwill” of its “stakeholders” and 
needs to institutionalised, particularly through legislation. These calls have led to various 
commitments to promulgate an EITI law. The process for an EITI law formally began in 
August 2007 when a workshop organised by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Mines 
and Energy led to a call for legal review, especially those relating to revenue management, 
and extractive sector transparency and accountability, as a way of institutionalising the EITI 
process. In January 2008, the Government with the support of GIZ contracted a local firm, 
Reindorf Chambers to review domestic laws pertaining to extractive sector transparency and 
accountability (personal interview with GIZ representative, August 26, 2013). The study 
found that the country’s laws adequately supported various aspects of GHEITI engagements 
and that there was no need for a separate EITI legislation. ISODEC and other NGOs raised 
questions about the consultant’s conclusion and sponsored another review, which 
recommended a separate legislation (ibid.). Following, these contested findings, the GIZ put 
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together a team to incorporate the Reindorf and ISODEC reports, which led to a proposed EITI 
Bill. However, the Bill, which was concluded sometime in 2012, is yet to be presented to 
Parliament fuelling speculations about the poor commitment of government and other 
“stakeholders” who have a stake in maintaining GHEITI’s non-compliant status.  
GHEITI also suffers from a great deal of representation crisis. At the nominal level, there are 
serious contentions, especially between “government” stakeholders and CSOs as to who best 
represents the “public.”  Government officials, usually cited what they consider as their 
constitutional and legal mandate, and were adamant that their presence and dominance of 
the NSC is based on justifiable democratic principles. A senior public officer, for instance, 
accused CSO representatives of “struggling to find legitimacy” and “not having a constituency 
that they report to” (personal interview, July 31, 2013). On the other hand, CSOs faulted 
government officials for just paying lip service to transparency largely to satisfy external 
constituents without following through on various recommendations (also see Gary et al., 
2009:48). These activists also insisted that most of the ground-breaking country variations 
of GHEITI were the outcomes of their vigilance and active engagements (see Manteaw, 
2010:102-3). These contested claims have been designated here as nominal in the sense that 
there is no compelling evidence about their adverse impact on coherence within the NSC, 
perhaps, due to its emphasis on consensus decision making. Nonetheless, beyond internal NSC 
processes, the real crisis of representation of GHEITI is evident by its failure to establish 
meaningful linkages with other representational platforms at the national and community 
levels. For instance, the disjuncture between representatives on the NSC and the general CSO 
community is demonstrated by the absence of any meaningful feedback mechanism. The 
claims about poor representation among CSOs were echoed by a leading activist who averred 
that: 
…our representatives do not report to us as they are supposed to be doing. There is no 
feedback mechanism. And so it is not just the [state] institutions that are not doing the 
consultations as they should, but even our representatives on these institutions 
[GHEITI and PIAC] that are representing interest groups are themselves not doing it 
(personal interview, October 1, 2013, insertion mine). 
Beyond vague representation of “multi-stakeholders,” GHEITI does not have any formal 
linkage with enforceable channels offered by state institutions, such as the legislature and the 
Office of the Auditor-General. In fact, none of the GHEITI reports has been debated in 
parliament. They have also not been a subject of scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC), the Mines and Energy Committee, and the Finance Committee.4 Respondents from the 
                                                          
4 In the case of the PAC, this is due to its legal requirement to consider only reports emanating from the Office 
of the Auditor-General. 
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GHEITI Secretariat and NSC admitted that GHEITI reports go to “no one,” except the “general 
public.”  They also maintained that the multi-stakeholder NSC has operated with a lot of 
goodwill, which has been critical in following up on various GHEITI’s findings and 
recommendations. For them, the “threat of washing your dirty linen in public” has served as 
effective incentive for compliance with EITI.  
An initiative that has shown some promise in linking the GHEITI with the broader populace 
are Dissemination Workshops which take the form of community forums and sensitisation 
meetings with parliamentarians. A member of the NSC maintained that the limited scope of 
the EITI framework means, “once government is declared compliant, it cuts off real 
community and citizen participation in the process.” Hence, these workshops represent a 
useful avenue to engage with, and receive feedback from, the public over some of its findings 
and activities (Koranteng, personal interview, August 20, 2013). Documented records of 
those meetings, personal interviews and participation in some these workshops, suggest that 
they represented the only tangible presence of GHEITI within the public domain. In areas 
such as Kenyasi and Kumasi, where recorded transcripts of the proceedings are available, 
various community actors raised a plethora of concerns that did not necessarily fall within 
the remit of GHEITI, like illegal mining activities (GHEITI Secretariat, 2011a; GHEITI 
Secretariat, 2011c). Nonetheless, some participants of these workshops, who were 
interviewed, averred that the NSC “rather than running around” with EITI reports, “should 
get into the media and disseminate information to the public.” 
 
Figure 2. Public Forum on the 2012/13 GHEITI Reports at Obuasi (photo credit. GHEITI Secretariat) 
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Compliance vs. Transformation 
Ghana’s adoption of the EITI model in the mineral and oil sectors has not escaped questions 
about its role in transforming the incentive challenges and institutional weaknesses within 
the extractive sector. In a similar vein, those who offer compliments to the EITI in Ghana often 
offer different claims about its transformative effects (IDL Group & Synergy Global, 2010; 
Manteaw, 2010; Nguyen-Thanh & Schnell, 2009). Notably, they have advanced GHEITI’s 
impact in providing deliberative platforms and ensuring transparency. Nonetheless, Ghana’s 
experience of EITI points to the fact that compliance with pre-determined notions of “good 
governance” in the extractive sector is not a highway to optimal political and institutional 
reform.  
Various proponents of the EITI model in Ghana, mostly in reference to the heightened 
opposition it initially received, often claim that they have been vindicated for supporting the 
Initiative. They support this claim by pointing to a host of institutional and policy reforms 
that have been witnessed in the extractive sector, which could be linked with GHEITI’s 
processes over the past decade. Members of the National Steering Committee who were 
interviewed for this study recalled the cynicism and agitations that characterised the mining 
sector in the pre-EITI era and asserted that the Initiative has contributed towards stabilising 
the extractive sector and provided an invaluable avenue for constructive engagements by 
various stakeholders. In addition, they argued that prior to GHEITI there were no systematic 
processes of information disclosure, as well as, a forum where the stakeholders in the industry 
could interrogate such disclosures.  
Supporters of GHEITI also maintained that the ensuing improvements in the relationship 
among CSOs, government and mining companies have led to an impressive compliance of 
the various stakeholders in the GHEITI programme. Indeed, with the exception of small-scale 
mining firms, the eight leading companies, constituting 99% of mineral royalty payments, 
report under the GHEITI (IDL Group & Synergy Global, 2010:40; World Bank, 2010:33). 
Likewise, despite its largely de-institutionalised mechanisms and voluntary processes, GHEITI 
has survived a political turnover between the two leading parties in Ghana - NPP and NDC - 
which points to an appreciable support among various political elites in the country. 
Additionally, various GHEITI reports are credited with increasing the level of transparency in 
the mining industry highlighting the flows of payments and receipts, as well as utilisation of 
mineral revenues at the national and sub-national levels. A senior official from the Ministry 
of Energy and Petroleum captured the importance of GHEITI’s disclosures for both non-state 
and state actors: 
The EITI reports received a lot of attention from civil society groups including 
trade unions, church groups, and faith-based groups. A lot of these reports 
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became Bibles for these groups in their advocacy work. To the government 
itself, some of the omissions and commissions that were exposed by the reports 
were quite informing… the outcome of the EITI reports became tools or 
justifications for government to undertake a number of reforms including 
reforms of the fiscal regime, reporting processes, monitoring of companies 
(interview, 2013). 
As hinted by the above assertion, a number of noticeable institutional improvements have 
been linked to EITI implementation. In the mining sector, these improvements include the 
revision of mineral royalties from a previous range of 3-6%, to a fixed rate of 5%, under the 
Minerals and Mining Amendment Act, Act 794 in 2010, which amended the Minerals and 
Mining Act of 2006. Some respondents from  GHEITI and some donor agencies told me that 
prior to the fixed rate, companies generally chose to pay the minimum rate of 3%, which 
adversely affected overall public revenues from the mining industry. They also maintain that 
various GHEITI reports have drawn public attention to a number of policy issues, such as 
capital gains tax, and inter-sectoral/agency collaboration over matters related to the 
extractive sector (also see Ghana Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, 2012:22-28). 
For instance, GHEITI reports are credited with the consolidation of the country’s revenue 
agencies into the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA).5  
Furthermore, members of the National Steering Committee highlighted various problems 
related to sub-national disbursement and expenditure of mineral royalties, which have 
become known through their reporting. In support of this position, they argued that GHEITI 
uncovered that within mining communities, royalty disbursements from the Office the 
Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) to local governments were, often delayed and used to 
fund operational and administrative expenses rather than development projects (also see 
GHEITI Secretariat, 2011b:24). Consequently, GHEITI has developed guidelines on the use and 
reporting of mineral revenue by District/Municipal Assemblies.  
Two main observations could be made from the reforms that are often linked with the GHEITI: 
The first and obvious point is that GHEITI-linked institutional and policy changes generally 
fall outside the remit of the EITI global standard. Consequently, it is not surprising that the 
EITI in Ghana often receive large-scale endorsements from the International Secretariat, and 
the wider EITI community. The second observation which is less obvious, but critical, relates 
to the difficulty in establishing linkages between these reforms and GHEITI. While lauding 
                                                          
5 The GRA was formed in 2009 following a merger of the country’s four revenue collection agencies i.e. Excise 
and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Value Added Tax Service (VATS) and the 




notable improvements and reforms in the extractive sector, various factors suggest that their 
linkages with the EITI is somewhat exaggerated.  
A case in point relates to the recorded increases in government revenue from the mining 
sector which, as reported by successive GHEITI reports, rose from $27 million in 2004, 
through $112 million in 2009, to $1270 million in 2013 (EITI International Secretariat, 
2015). Whereas GHEITI and the international EITI community have been quick to point to 
these increases as demonstration of EITI’s contribution, there are compelling reasons to 
suggest that the surge in public revenues from the mining industry has been rather fuelled by 
enhanced commercial activities in response to various pro-market reforms. Most notably, 
during the same period, companies reporting under the EITI increased from eight to 21 (ibid.). 
From the perspectives of extractive firms, successive reports on the performance of the mining 
industry by the Ghana Chamber of Mines have underlined other intervening factors for 
revenue increases, including appreciation in output and increases in realised price of gold 
(see Ghana Chamber of Mines, 2008; 2009; 2013).  
Within the broader ambit of various research of Ghana’s mining sector, there is a critical body 
of literature that have linked the country’s enhanced mineral revenues with several pro-
investment policy incentives. These included the repeal of the Additional Profit Tax Law 
(1985), provisions for stability agreements for a period of about 15 years, as well as import 
duty exemptions, most of which were consolidated under the Minerals and Mining Act (Act 
703), 2006 (see Akabzaa et al., 2007; Akabzaa, 2009; Aryeetey et al., 2004). Just like the 
critical voices of civil society activists, which were reported earlier in this chapter, these 
analysts attributed mineral revenue increases to commercial activities propped up by the 
reforms, and asked critical questions as to whether government’s share and community 
benefits are fair. Whereas it is impossible to refute the linkages between EITI and enhanced 
commercial engagements in the mining sector in Ghana, similar ties cannot be easily 
established between the EITI and broader institutional changes that have altered the lop-sided 
distribution of political power and resources since reforms under the ERPs, especially around 
mining communities. 
The difficulty in establishing linkages between successful reforms with EITI is further 
compounded by other parallel claims. A deeper examination of reports from other donor-
funded programmes in Ghana’s extractive sector reveals claims that are similar to those often 
cited for the EITI. Of significance is the NREG, which is a World Bank-led multi-donor parallel 
programme for the extractive sector. Domestically, NREG’s relationship with GHEITI remains 
poorly defined. Nonetheless, both served as unique outlets through which the World Bank, 
and its allied donors, supported EITI implementation in Ghana, while driving other reforms 
in areas of the extractive industry that were not covered by the EITI. GHEITI framework, and 
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its much-touted innovative strategies, in many ways, reflects a strategy of state elites to win 
the benefit streams that came with both EITI and NREG. However, the point of interest here is 
that the parallel implementation of GHEITI and NREG has led to overlap of claims by both 
programmes for almost every positive development in the extractive industry. A scrutiny of 
the 2010 Validation Report of GHEITI and a 2014 evaluation of NREG by the World Bank 
elaborate this point in detail (see IDL Group & Synergy ltd, 2010; World Bank-IEG, 2014). For 
instance, NREG claims its intervention accounted for the expansion of EITI reporting to cover 
sub-national payments (World Bank-IEG, ibid: 28). The 2014 Evaluation also links NREG with 
the upward revision of royalty payments from 3-6% to a fixed 5% (ibid: 27). On the matter of 
capital gains tax, NREG asserts that it developed financial models of 9 (of the 13) large mines 
in Ghana, which “indicated that capital gains taxes were largely being avoided by large 
mining companies, and led to efforts to address this problem and collect taxes (ibid).  
Beyond the issue of linkages, Ghana’s religious compliance of EITI requirements has failed to 
convince critics about its promise of promoting effective management of natural resources. 
In the past years, these criticisms have been voiced on various GHEITI’s platforms. A scrutiny 
of reports from various GHEITI dissemination workshops and other public engagements 
reveals a stark contrast between what GHEITI offers, and the expectations of its intended 
“beneficiaries.” A member of the NSC poignantly depicted this divergence: 
From our dissemination workshops, the feedback is not only an interest in whether we 
got revenue or not but how the companies would address the legacy issues; the 
environmental pollution; the water stress in communities because of mining; the 
takeover of community lands... So you realise that yes we are doing A B C D. But is it 
what the people want us to do?  That is the linkage that should be developed from the 
community, from the citizens, the national secretariat and international secretariat 
(interview, 2013). 
The above viewpoint was supported by various field interviews with activists at the 
community and national level. In the Western Region, for instance, there were concerns that 
the revenue-centeredness of GHEITI has masked other aspects of the extractive sector in the 
region, specifically questions about environmental damages and costs, as well as threats to 
livelihoods.6 The absence of a complete account of “serious environmental and social 
concerns” was also raised at another Dissemination Workshop in the Northern Region (see 
GHEITI, 2013:11). Various participants at the Workshop, which was organised in the 
regional capital, Tamale, complained that GHEITI reports seems to “dwell more on revenues 
thereby reducing benefits to only cash” (ibid). At the Ghana Trade Union Congress, senior 
officers criticised GHEITI for not probing questions concerning equity or asking whether 
                                                          
6 Field interviews with various members of Friends of the Nation, Western Region,  
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government receipts represent “what the country really deserve to get” (interviews, 2013). 
Within the mining sector, in particular, GHEITI was often faulted for not helping to reverse 
the lopsided market reforms dating back to the 1980s that strengthened mining companies 
against the state. Consequently, these critics tend to align EITI with other reforms in the 
mining sector, including the revised Minerals and Mining Act (2006), that have maintained 
pro-market status quo without addressing issues of public ownership, local capacity and even 
domestic entrepreneurial development (interviews with Third World Network Officers, 
2013). 
Conclusion 
A critical interrogation of the contradictory and contested viewpoints about the impact of 
Ghana’s EITI experience points to the one thing. That, in the context of deep-seated structural 
and institutional limitations, external initiatives often pushed by a loose network of external 
development agencies based on questionable normative goals of “good governance” cannot 
serve as effective instruments of reform in the extractive industry. This observation 
reverberates with many accounts between pro-market reforms in the mining sector and poor 
outcomes in terms of readjustments of power and distributional patterns, especially within 
various mining communities (see Bebbington et al., 2008; Bridge, 2004; Campbell, 2006; Le 
Billon, 2005). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, substantial research has revealed that various 
reforms, which were often implemented by many mineral-rich countries as part of the SAPs 
and current “good governance,” have rather produced a “feast on super profits” (2009:5), 
while the burden of taxation has been comprehensively reduced. Most significantly, a 
comprehensive account offered by Hilson & Maconachie (2008) in countries like Mali and 
Tanzania, indicated that the “mining boom” in Africa came with low returns to the “sovereign 
owners of sub-soil resources.” They also noted that legislation is replete with enhanced 
incentives for companies in areas such as land ownerships and security of tenure, import and 
export tax regimes, ancillary services, and land access (see Bracking, 2009; Filho, 2002; 
Hilson & Maconachie, 2008). Hence, as noted by Bracking (ibid:8), for various actors with 
commercial interests in the mining sector, joining and supporting the EITI is a “small 
commitment” in the face of  the benefits accruing from the current “neo-liberal” regulatory 
regime in Africa. 
By emphasising rules and institutional practices that could address sub-optimal economic 
behaviour and outcomes, the fast-growing interest in governance has been pivotal in forging 
tripartite networks and platforms around issues of transparency and accountability in 
resource-rich countries. As demonstrated by the experience of the EITI in Ghana, these 
networks and platforms have been useful at not only drawing public attention to revenue 
transparency but also securing limited policy and institutional changes. For all its merits, 
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many EITI platforms have been less inclusive and effective than is often admitted. This 
sobering observation becomes more evident upon a closer examination of the normative 
undercurrents of the EITI, which reflect market-oriented, and apolitical governance fixes, 
and how they shape the institutional landscape of implementing countries. Given 
longstanding assumptions about the corrosive effects of natural resources on state 
institutions, various participatory and public accountability platforms that have been created 
under the EITI, and other governance initiatives, often attempt to either side-step the state or 
allow it to operate on the basis of a restricted partnership with private and non-governmental 
actors (see Ahrens, 2011; Falkner, 2003; Haufler, 2013; World Bank-IEG, 2008). Yet, this 
view beggars belief, especially given the enduring presence of state institutional structures 
and the “deep politics” of elite instrumentalities that work to either facilitate or subdue reform 
in resource-rich countries. This paper has demonstrated that whereas Ghana’s EITI has 
generated some important reforms, it has been unable to mediate the multiple logics and 
political fragmentations that combine to undermine any prospect for inclusive and effective 
reform in the extractive sector (see Andrews, 2013; Khan, 2012). Consequently, domestic 
political elites at various points of EITI implementation have managed to retain some residual 
controls to win external legitimacy and local political support. Contrary to general critiques 
of the EITI, this problem is not because it is enforced through voluntary compliance and 
goodwill, but, critically, the lack of stronger complementarities with established platforms 
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